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 International Sale of Goods 
 By Gregory M. Duhl * 
 INTRODUCTION 
 The U.S. Supreme Court ’ s decision in  Medellín v. Texas 1 raised questions 
about the effect of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods ( “ CISG ” ) 2 in the United States. An international treaty, 
such as the CISG, is only enforceable in U.S. courts as domestic law if it is 
self-executing or ratifi ed by Congress. 3 Congress never ratifi ed the CISG, so it 
is enforceable as domestic law only if it is self-executing. In  Medellín , the Court 
held that in order to be self-executing, a treaty must  “ itself convey[] an inten-
tion that it be  ‘ self-executing. ’ ” 4 The Court stated that this does not require that 
the  “ treaty provide for self-execution in so many talismanic words, ” 5 but rather 
requires  “ courts to decide whether a treaty ’ s terms refl ect a determination by 
the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confi rmed it that the treaty 
has domestic effect. ” 6 While it is likely the CISG was self-executing, 7  Medellín 
raises at least a lingering question of whether the CISG is enforeceable as a mat-
ter of domestic law. 8 
 Putting that question aside, in 2008, U.S. courts interpreted the scope, forma-
tion, modifi cation, excuse, notice, and remedies provisions of the CISG. The criti-
cal decisions and their relevance are discussed below. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I thank Emily Babcock and Eric 
Elzen for their research assistance with this Survey. 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 2. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 
1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671,  available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [here-
inafter CISG]. 
 3.  Medellín , 128 S. Ct. at 1351. 
 4.  Id . at 1356. 
 5.  Id . at 1366. 
 6.  Id . 
 7.  See, e.g. , Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the 
CISG is a self-executing treaty). 
 8.  See Posting of Jeremy Tallman to Contracts Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/con
tractsprof_blog/2008/03/medellín-and-th.html (Mar. 28, 2008, 05:57 EST) (“ Medellín and the CISG”); 
 see also Mark Cantora,  The CISG After Medellín v. Texas:  Do U.S. Businesses Have It? Do They Want It? , 
8  J. INT ’ L BUS. & L. 111, 113–20 (2009) (discussing whether the CISG is self-executing after  Medellín ). 
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 SCOPE 
 In  Novelis Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. , 9 the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio found that the CISG did not apply where the seller’s predecessor 
(the original party to the contract) and the buyer both had places of business in 
the United States at the time the contract was formed. For purposes of determin-
ing whether the CISG is applicable to a contract, a critical factor is where a party 
has its place of business at the time of contract formation, not at the time of the 
dispute. In  Novelis , the court found that, despite references to the seller’s prede-
cessor as a Canadian company, it was a Texas corporation and therefore the CISG 
did not apply. 10 
 In  Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC , 11 the court recognized that a 
claim of negligent misrepresentation must be decided under state law because neg-
ligent misrepresentation is outside the scope of the CISG. According to the court: 
 [N]egligent misrepresentation is a tort claim completely different from a claim for 
breach of contract. Being a tort claim, the court concludes that it is not controlled 
by the CISG, which only concerns the sales of goods between merchants in different 
countries, and that since this action is a diversity action, Global’s claim for negligent 
misrepresentation is controlled by state law. 12 
 In  Valeo Sistemas Electricos S.A. de C.V. v. CIF Licensing, LLC , 13 the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of what happens if appli-
cation of the CISG is uncertain when ruling on a motion to dismiss.  Valeo arose 
out of a dispute between a Mexican company, Valeo C.V., and a U.S. company, 
Stmicroelectronics, Inc. (“STM”). Valeo C.V. alleged that STM was required to 
indemnify it in a patent infringement suit. The parties’ contract contained four 
provisions that could possibly have governed the indemnifi cation issue (one of 
which was the default provisions of the CISG). 14 Which provision applied was a 
question of contract interpretation that the court could not resolve on a motion 
to dismiss. 15 Therefore, the court found that as long as Valeo C.V. could allege its 
claim under at least one of the four possible provisions, it would deny STM’s mo-
tion to dismiss. 16 The court ultimately held that Valeo was able to allege its claim 
under Valeo’s General Terms so it denied the motion to dismiss. 17 
  9. 559 F. Supp. 2d 877, 882 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 10.  See id . The parties in this case agreed that New York law applied, so even if Novelis was found to 
have been a Canadian corporation, the CISG still would not have applied because the parties decided 
to opt out pursuant to article 6.  See id . at 882.  See also CISG,  supra note 2, art. 6 (permiting parties to 
“exclude application of this Convention”). 
 11. No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 WL 754734, at *1, *6–11 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008). 
 12.  Id . at *7. The court went on to deny Global’s motion for summary judgment on the misrepre-
sentation issue, fi nding the facts did not support its claim.  Id . at *7–9. 
 13. No. 06-627-GMS-LPS, 2008 WL 2736819, at *4 (D. Del. July 18, 2008). 
 14.  Id . The four provisions were “(1) Valeo’s General Terms; (ii) STM’s Terms and Conditions of 
Sale; (iii) the default contractual provisions of the [U.C.C.]; and/or (iv) the default provisions of the 
[CISG].”  Id . 
 15.  See id . at *4. 
 16.  Id . at *4–6. 
 17.  Id . 
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 FORMATION AND RESERVATION UNDER THE CISG 
 In  Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Power Source Supply, Inc. , 18 the court had to decide 
if the purchase order or bills of sale were the operative version of a contract for 
the sale of locomotives. Because the bills of sale materially altered the terms of the 
purchase order, the bills of sale, when executed by the parties, became their fi nal 
agreement under CISG article 19. 19 
 On February 9, 2008, the plaintiff, Power Source, a Canadian corporation with 
its principal place of business in Canada, faxed the defendant, Norfolk, a U.S. 
company, a fi nal purchase order. The locomotives were delivered and the de-
fendant executed the plaintiff’s bills of sale on February 14, 2008. The bills of 
sale contained disclaimers of implied warranties, which the purchase order did 
not. The court found that CISG article 19 applied, and found that because the 
disclaimer in the bills of sale related to both the quality of the goods and Nor-
folk’s liability to Power Source, the bills of sale materially altered the terms of the 
purchase order and therefore constituted a counteroffer by Norfolk that Power 
Source accepted by its execution of the bills of sale. 20 Therefore, the fi nal agree-
ment included no implied warranties. 21 
 Further, under article 74, the court awarded the plaintiff the outstanding 
$784,315 balance on the contract, and noted that Norfolk could not collect at-
torney’s fees under article 75 or any other article of the CISG. 22 
 The court then had to calculate prejudgment interest. According to the court, 
Article 78 entitled Norfolk to prejudgment interest, but the CISG does not spec-
ify how that rate is to be determined. 23 Because the dispute was a federal ques-
tion, the court calculated the interest rate pursuant to federal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(a), 24 under which interest accrues at a rate equal to the weekly average 
one-year constant maturity Treasury yield. 25 
 Key Safety Systems, Inc. v. Invista, S.A.R.L., L.L.C . 26 provides a good illustration 
of circularity between the battle-of-the-forms provisions in the CISG and the 
 18. No. 06-58 J, 2008 WL 2884102, at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008). 
 19.  See id . at *7.  See also CISG,  supra note 2, art. 19 (providing reply to offer constitutes counterof-
fer if reply contains additions, limitations, or other modifi cations that materially alter terms of offer 
and terms relating to quality of goods and extent of party’s liability materially alter terms of offer). 
 20.  Norfolk  S., 2008 WL 2884102, at *6–7. 
 21.  Id . at *7. Although the CISG does not specifi cally include the implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fi tness for a particular purpose, article 35 can be read to suggest that such warranties exist. 
 See id . at *5. Article 35 also allows for their disclaimer, which is what the parties did in this case.  See 
id . Although article 35 permits disclaimer by agreement, it does not provide the standard by which the 
validity of the disclaimer should be judged.  See CISG,  supra note 2, art. 4(a) (providing that the CISG 
does not address the validity of contract provisions). The court turned to the law of Alberta, Canada 
(the relevant province) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the relevant U.S. state) to determine 
the disclaimer’s validity. Finding that the provision was conspicuous and mentioned “merchantability” 
so as to satisfy the U.C.C. as applicable in Pennsylvania and indicated express agreement as required 
by Alberta law, the disclaimer was effective regardless of whether Pennsylvania or Alberta law gov-
erned.  See Norfolk S., 2008 WL 2884102, at *5–6. 
 22.  Norfolk S ., 2008 WL 2884102, at *7. 
 23.  See id. See also infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006). 
 25.  Norfolk S. , 2008 WL 2884102, at *8. 
 26. No. 08-CV-10558, 2008 WL 4279358 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2008). 
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Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The case arose out of a contract dispute 
between Key Safety Systems, Inc. (“KSS”), a Delaware corporation, and Invista, 
a Luxembourg corporation. KSS claimed there was a requirements contract bet-
ween it and Invista for the supply of specially manufactured yarn. Although no 
written contract was ever signed, KSS alleged the contract provided for accep-
tance by performance. KSS claimed Invista agreed to the contract when it shipped 
the yarn. Invista, on the other hand, argued that it never accepted the require-
ments contract, and that it made a counteroffer each time it shipped the yarn 
with terms and conditions, which KSS agreed to when it accepted the yarn. The 
sole question before the court was whether it should grant injunctive relief to 
KSS while the issue of whether there was a requirements contract was litigated. 
The court ultimately granted the injunction in part and denied it in part, holding 
that Invista would have to continue to supply yarn, but KSS would have to pay 
Invista’s last quoted price. 27 
 What is interesting about this case (in relation to the CISG) is Invista’s second-
ary argument, which was that if its counteroffers were not valid (and the require-
ments contract was formed when it shipped the yarn), then the choice-of-law 
provision in its Terms and Conditions opting out of the CISG would likewise not 
be valid under U.C.C. section 2-207(3). 28 By default, the CISG would control 
and, under the CISG, formation of a requirements contract might not have been 
possible in this case. 29 If the parties did not have a requirements contract, the fact 
that Invista’s terms materially altered the terms of KSS’s purchase order would 
make Invista’s terms control under CISG article 19, 30 and Invista opted out of the 
CISG. The U.C.C. would apply. The reasoning is circular. The court never ad-
dressed this issue, but it is worth highlighting. 
 In  Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros International, Inc ., 31 the court asked the parties 
to brief the relevance and application of the CISG to their dispute and ultimately 
held that the seller could not show that a contract existed because of Argentina’s 
reservation to the CISG, which necessitates that all contracts governed by the CISG 
be in writing where one of the parties has its place of business in Argentina. 
 The case involves an Argentinean corporation, Forestal Guarani (“Forestal”), and 
a New Jersey corporation, Daros International (“Daros”). Daros is an import-export 
corporation, and Forestal manufactures lumber products, including wooden fi n-
ger joints. Around 1999, the parties entered into a verbal agreement under which 
Daros agreed to sell Forestal’s fi nger joints to various third-party purchasers in the 
United States. When a dispute arose as to part of the purchase price that the seller 
alleged it did not receive, the court directed the parties to submit a supplemental 
briefi ng addressing fi ve points of law regarding the CISG: 
 27.  Key Safety Sys. , 2008 WL 4279358, at *13–14. 
 28.  See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2002). 
 29.  See Key Safety Sys. , 2008 WL 4279358, at *9 n.2. The court never actually reached the issue of 
whether the CISG would bar a requirements contract.  See id . 
 30.  See CISG,  supra note 2, art. 19. 
 31. No. 03-4821 ( JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *1–2, *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008). 
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 (1) Does the [CISG] govern this dispute?; (2) Are any of the exceptions contained 
in the CISG applicable to the instant action?; (3) What effect does the application of 
the CISG Treaty have on this dispute?; (4) Does the Treaty preempt State law causes 
of action?; and (5) Does the CISG provide the exclusive remedy to Forestal in this 
dispute? 32 
 If a non-consumer contract is silent as to choice of law, the CISG applies to the 
agreement if the parties have places of business in different signatory states. 33 The 
court noted that article 11 of the CISG provides that parties to contracts governed 
by the CISG are not required to memorialize their agreements in writing and may 
enforce oral contracts. 34 However, CISG article 12 allows the signatories to the 
CISG to opt out of article 11 and require written contracts. 35 Argentina chose to 
exercise its reservation option pursuant to article 96, and therefore, under the 
CISG as ratifi ed by Argentina, a contract must be in writing to be enforceable. 36 
 The court found that where only one party is from a state that has made an ar-
ticle 96 reservation to article 11, the contract must be in writing. 37 The court must 
respect the policy of that member state not to bind its citizens to oral contracts 
with citizens of other member states despite the goal of the CISG to facilitate inter-
national commerce. 38 Because the plaintiff did not allege that there was a written 
contract between the parties, and there was no written evidence of any contract, 
the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim failed. 39 
 The same issue arose in  Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., Ltd. v. 
Microfl ock Textile Group Corp . 40 The parties had an ongoing business relationship 
between 2002 and 2004. The plaintiff, a Chinese company, fi led an action against 
the defendant, a U.S. company, for failing to make full payment on goods deliv-
ered and accepted. There were eight separate orders and shipments and therefore 
eight contracts; for each one, the defendant sent a purchase order and the plaintiff 
accepted the order when it sent the plaintiff a packing list and invoice with the 
fi lled order. The defendant argued that its obligation to pay the plaintiff the total 
amount due on the eight invoices was modifi ed. 
 However, because the defendant produced no evidence of a written modifi ca-
tion, the court denied its claim. 41 China has made a declaration under article 96 
requiring contracts to be in writing, just as Argentina has. 42 Because one contract-
ing party was from China, the court would not consider whether there was a 
modifi cation without a writing. 43 
 32.  Id . at *1–2. 
 33.  See id . at *3. 
 34.  See id . 
 35.  Id . 
 36.  Id . 
 37.  See id . at *4.  See also infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 38.  Forestal Guarani , 2008 WL 4560701, at *4. 
 39.  See id . 
 40. No. 06-22608, 2008 WL 2098062, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008). 
 41.  See id . at *5. 
 42.  See id . at *3.  See also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 43.  See Zhejiang Shaoxing , 2008 WL 2098062, at *4–5. 
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 MODIFICATION 
 Two CISG cases in 2008 required courts to consider whether a forum selec-
tion clause in a seller’s terms of sale was a modifi cation to a contract, with the 
courts coming out differently but agreeing that the critical factor was whether 
the buyer agreed to the modifi cation. In  Solae, LLC v. Hershey Canada, Inc. , 44 the 
seller’s terms of sale did not modify a contract between the parties because the 
buyer did not assent to the terms. 
 For several years, Solae, LLC (“Solae”), had supplied soy lecithin to Hershey 
Canada, Inc. (“Hershey”), a Canadian corporation. In late 2005, Solae and Her-
shey negotiated a contract for 2006. The parties did not mention the seller’s Con-
ditions of Sale during their negotiations but the buyer was allegedly familiar with 
them from past dealings. Pursuant to the agreement, the buyer faxed the seller a 
purchase order on June 21, 2006, and the seller sent an order confi rmation before 
delivery that referred to its Conditions of Sale but did not contain them. The seller 
sent the buyer an invoice after shipment that contained its Conditions of Sale, 
including a forum selection clause giving Delaware exclusive jurisdiction over any 
dispute arising under the agreement. 
 The court fi rst found that the parties had reached an agreement as to the quan-
tity and price of the soy lecithin Solace sold Hershey in 2006 suffi cient to create a 
contract under the CISG. 45 The contact negotiated by the parties did not contain 
a forum selection clause, and there was no evidence that the buyer agreed to a 
modifi cation of the contract, beyond receipt of the Conditions of Sale. 46 Without 
a forum selection clause, the court analyzed whether it had personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant, and concluded that it did not and dismissed the complaint. 47 
 In  BTC-USA Corp. v. Novacare , 48 the court found that when the buyer initialed 
the seller’s general conditions of sale adjacent to a forum selection clause, the 
parties modifi ed their contact under CISG article 29 and agreed to litigate their 
disputes in France. The court therefore found that venue in the U.S. District Court 
was improper and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. 49 
 The seller Mougeot-Copy (“M-C”), a subsidiary of Novacare, entered into an 
oral contract in March 2004 with the buyer, BTC-USA Corp. (“BTC”), to supply 
paper. Before fi lling BTC’s order, M-C required that BTC confi rm its agreement 
to the seller’s terms on a pro forma invoice, and BTC’s vice president signed the 
seller’s invoice and initialed the general conditions of sale adjacent to the forum 
selection clause. The issue is whether the parties modifi ed their oral agreement to 
include the forum selection clause under CISG article 29. 
 44. 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (D. Del. 2008). 
 45.  See id . at 457. 
 46.  See id . at 458. The court relied on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in  Chateu Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc. , 328 F.3d 528 (9th Cir.),  cert. denied , 540 U.S. 1049 
(2003).  See id. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 47.  See Solae , 557 F. Supp. 2d at 458–61. 
 48. No. 07-3998 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 2465814, at *4–5 (D. Minn. June 16, 2008). 
 49.  See id . at *5. 
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 The court found that when the buyer initialed the general conditions of sale, 
it assented to the forum selection clause. 50 Even though the modifi cation was a 
material alteration, parties may materially alter their contracts under article 29. 51 
While the buyer argued that the court should not enforce the forum selection 
clause “because doing so would result in hardship and surprise,” the court found 
that “hardship and surprise” is relevant under U.C.C. section 2-207, 52 but not to 
whether parties assent to a modifi cation under the CISG. 53 
 The buyer also argued that the vice president did not read or understand the 
forum selection clause, but the court properly acknowledged that failing to read 
or understand terms generally does not render contracts avoidable. 54 The buyer 
contended that the forum selection clause was unreasonable because it was incon-
venient and would impose a fi nancial hardship. The court responded that “BTC 
has not alleged that it is incapable of litigating in France because of the economic 
expense and there is no support for the proposition that fi nancial hardship by 
itself warrants a fi nding that the forum selection clause is unreasonable.” 55 The 
court ultimately found the forum selection clause enforceable and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). 56 
 IMPRACTICABILITY 
 In  Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq , 57 the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York used the commercial impracticability doctrine from the 
U.C.C. to interpret the CISG in a case without any American parties. In a dispute 
revolving around the inability to perform a contract in light of the threat and com-
mencement of the Iraq War in 2003, the court noted that while the commercial 
impracticability doctrine can relieve a seller from performance, it does not require 
the buyer to pay for goods it never received. 58 
 The plaintiff Hilaturas Miel, S.L. (“Hilaturas”), is a Spanish company, and the 
Republic of Iraq (the “Republic”) is a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 59 
In 1995, the U.N. Security Council adopted the Oil for Food Programme (the 
“OFFP”), which directed the U.N. Secretary-General to establish an escrow account 
to be funded by the sale of Iraqi petroleum and to be used for Iraqi civilian needs. 
 50.  See id . at *4.  Compare id., with Chateu Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 
528, 531 (9th Cir.) (holding buyer’s failure to object to forum selection clause in invoices did not 
constitute assent to the clause),  cert. denied , 540 U.S. 1049 (2003). 
 51.  BTC USA , 2008 WL 2465814, at *4. 
 52.  See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002) (providing additional term in acceptance does not become part 
of contract between merchants if term materially alters contract);  id . cmt. 4 (providing term that results 
in surprise or undue hardship materially alters contract for purposes of section 2-207). 
 53.  BTC USA , 2008 WL 2465814, at *4. 
 54.  See id . 
 55.  Id . at *5. 
 56.  See id . 
 57. 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785, 799–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 58.  See id . at 800. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006). 
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Hilaturas was substituted for another party to a contract with the State Company 
for Shopping Centers, an Iraqi state-owned enterprise, to provide acrylic yarn in 
2002, and the plaintiff made partial shipment and received partial payments from 
an account in the United States pursuant to a letter of credit. 
 In March 2003, the U.N. Secretary-General announced, with the prospect of war 
with Iraq looming, that he could not guarantee secure delivery of OFFP shipments. 
Part of the yarn supplied by the plaintiff and destined for Iraq never reached Iraq. 
On March 17, 2003, the OFFP inspectors were removed from Iraq; those inspec-
tors were necessary to issue the credit-conform documents to allow the plaintiff 
to be paid on its letter of credit. Two days later, on March 19, hostilities with Iraq 
began. Coalition Forces invaded Baghdad on April 9, 2003, state-owned enter-
prises were looted, and the Government of Iraq soon ceased to exist. In June 2004, 
the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution providing for the interim gov-
ernment of Iraq to assume responsibility for all obligations relating to the OFFP. 
The parties do not dispute that the CISG governs the contract at issue, which the 
plaintiff alleges that the Republic breached in not performing its obligation to pay 
for the goods (that it never received) under the OFFP contract. 
 The court fi rst explained that the Republic was not responsible for performance 
under CISG article 79. 60 Under that article, “ ‘[a] party is not liable for failure to 
perform on any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an im-
pediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or 
to have avoided or overcome it.’ ” 61 Because Iraqi inspectors were withdrawn, the 
plaintiff could neither deliver its goods nor obtain credit-conform documents, the 
latter of which was a condition precedent to payment on the letter of credit and 
an express requirement of the contract. 62 
 While the plaintiff alleged that the Republic had to accept alternative perfor-
mance once it became clear that the credit-conform documents could not be ob-
tained, the court stated it was unaware of any such duty. 63 While the plaintiff cited 
CISG article 54, the court noted that article 54 does not address whether the buyer 
is required to accept alternative performance when the seller cannot perform its 
obligations under a contract, but rather, it discusses the buyer’s performance. 64 
 The court next noted that CISG article 46(2) addresses substitute goods and not 
substitute performance, but could still be used to determine the appropriate rule 
for substitute performance because the CISG is silent on this issue. 65 Article 46(2) 
states, “ ‘If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require de-
livery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental 
breach of contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunc-
 60.  See Hilaturas , 781 F. Supp. 2d at 798. 
 61.  Id . (quoting CISG,  supra note 2, art. 79(1)). 
 62.  See id . at 799–800. 
 63.  See id . at 799. 
 64.  See id . 
 65.  See id . 
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tion with notice given under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.’ ” 66 
Further, as did the court in  Macromex SRL v. Global International, Inc. , 67 the court 
looked at U.C.C. section 2-614 to determine the extent to which substitute per-
formance should be required under the CISG. 68 The court also found that the con-
cept of “fundamental breach” under the CISG is comparable to terms that go to 
the “essence of the agreement” under offi cial comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-614; 
thus, section 2-614 could be used to address the issue of substitute performance 
under the CISG. 69 
 The court concluded that the plaintiff “failed to allege that it ever tendered rea-
sonable substitute performance, nor does [i]t describe any method of substitute 
performance that was available.” 70 Further, inspection in Iraq was an “essential 
term” of the plaintiff’s contract. While the plaintiff argued that the Republic had 
the obligation to provide substitute performance under the contract, that “turn[ed] 
the doctrine of impossibility on its head,” because it was the plaintiff and not the 
Republic that could not perform because of the war and the withdrawal of the 
inspectors. 71 The court was correct in not requiring the Republic to pay for goods 
that were never delivered because of circumstances unforeseen by and outside the 
control of the contracting parties. 
 NOTICE OF NON-CONFORMITY 
 In  Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC , 72 the court denied motions of 
both the buyer and seller for summary judgment on the buyer’s counterclaims for 
breach of contract, 73 but found that the buyer gave timely notice of its breach of 
contract counterclaim under CISG article 39. 
 For almost three years prior to the lawsuit, Sky Cast, a Canadian manufacturer 
of concrete light poles, and Global, an American buyer of these light poles for 
construction projects in the United States, had established a course of dealing be-
tween them. On April 20, 2006, consistent with the pattern of performance that 
had arisen between the two parties, Global sent a purchase order to Sky Cast, and 
despite some problems with the production of the light poles and the timing of 
deliveries, Sky Cast ultimately shipped the light poles and Global accepted them. 
Sky Cast sued Global for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
and unjust enrichment, and Global fi led a breach of contract counterclaim against 
 66.  Id . (quoting CISG,  supra note 2, art. 46(2)). 
 67. No. 08 Civ. 114 (SAS), 2008 WL 1752530 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008). For more on this case, see 
 infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 68.  See Hilaturas , 781 F. Supp. 2d at 800. 
 69.  See id . (citing U.C.C. § 2-614 cmt. 1(2002)). 
 70.  Id . 
 71.  Id . 
 72. 65 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 589, 595–96 (E.D. Ky. 2008). 
 73. The court did fi nd the seller was entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract claim 
seeking payment for unpaid goods accepted under the contract.  Id . at 594. The only issue remain-
ing was the amount of damages to which the seller was entitled, which required consideration of the 
buyer’s counterclaim for breach of contract due to delay in shipment. 
1290 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 64, August 2009 
Sky Cast for the damages it suffered from the delays in delivery. Sky Cast argued 
that U.C.C. section 2-607 74 precluded Global from recovering on its counterclaim 
as the buyer did not give notice within a reasonable time after the purported 
breach. 
 The court found that because the CISG and not the U.C.C. governed the trans-
action between the parties, the applicable provision was CISG article 39. 75 The 
court quoted CISG article 39: 
 (1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does 
not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a 
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
 (2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods 
if he does not give notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the 
date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless this time-
limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee. 76 
 The court found that, in essence, the non-conformity that Global alleged was a 
delay in the shipments. The court construed CISG article 39 to permit Global a 
full two years to notify Sky Cast that the goods were non-conforming. 77 In other 
words, the court cast aside what seemed to be, at least as stated in CISG article 39, 
a “reasonable time” requirement with a cap of two years 78 in favor of a two-year 
statute of limitations. 79 Thus, according to this erroneous construction, two years 
is the  minimum (and maximum) time allotted under the CISG, and no matter 
what the product or the defect is, the buyer has two years to inform the seller of 
the non-conformity. In this case, the court found that because it was indisputable 
that Global fi led its counterclaim within two years from the time of the purported 
breach by Sky Cast, it had given Sky Cast adequate notice. 80 
 REMEDIES 
 LOST PROFITS 
 In  Macromex SRL v. Globex International, Inc ., 81 the court found that lost profi ts 
calculated under CISG article 74 should be based on the market value of the 
goods at their intended place of sale. Globex, an American company, sells food 
products to foreign countries. Globex contracted to sell Macromex, a Romanian 
company, 112 containers of chicken parts and deliver them to Romania. The CISG 
governed the contract. 
 74.  See U.C.C. § 2-607 (2002) (requiring buyer to give notice within reasonable time from when 
buyer discovered or should have discovered seller’s breach or lose all remedy for that breach). 
 75.  See Sky Cast , 655 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 595. 
 76.  Id . (quoting CISG, supra note 2, at. 39). 
 77.  Id . 
 78. CISG,  supra note 2, art. 39(1). 
 79.  See Sky Cast , 655 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 595. 
 80.  See id . 
 81. No. 08 Civ. 114 (SAS), 2008 WL 1752530, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008). 
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 The contract required that Globex make fi nal shipment by May 29, 2006; how-
ever, by June 2, 2006, Globex had failed to ship sixty-two of the containers. On 
June 2, 2006, the Romanian government declared that, as of June 7, 2006, no 
chicken could be imported into the country unless it was certifi ed by that later 
date. Between June 2 and June 7, Globex shipped twenty of the remaining sixty-
two containers that it had contracted to sell. As of June 7, the remaining forty-two 
containers could not be shipped to Romania because Globex had failed to satisfy 
the certifi cation requirement. Macromex brought arbitration proceedings against 
Globex for breach of contract and won. 
 In court challenging the arbitral award, Globex argued that damages calculated 
under CISG article 74 should not refl ect the market price of chicken in Roma-
nia, but rather refl ect the price in Georgia (where Macromex proposed that Globex 
ship the chickens in light of the impossibility of performing in Romania). “Globex 
reason[ed] that if it breached, it did so by failing to complete the substituted per-
formance (shipping to Georgia), not by failing to ship to Romania, which was 
impossible.” 82 Because the arbitrator rejected Globex’s force majeure defense (fi nding 
that Globex could have provided substitute performance and shipped to Macromex 
in Georgia), 83 the contract was breached and article 74 applied. 84 However, under 
CISG article 74, lost profi ts are calculated as the amount foreseeable at the time the 
contract is executed, and therefore the arbitrator correctly found that they should 
be based on the market value of chickens in Romania at the time of performance. 85 
 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
 Two courts in 2008 reached opposite results as to whether a party could earn 
prejudgment interest running from the time of an arbitral confi rmation to a judg-
ment, an issue on which the CISG is silent. In  Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory 
Co., Ltd. v. ACI International, Inc. , 86 the court, citing to a U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York case, 87 found that not awarding prejudgment inter-
est from the time of an arbitral award would impede U.S. policy of favoring arbi-
tration in international commerce, which is a purpose of the CISG to promote. 
 In 2003, Chinese plaintiff Guang Dong brought an action against American de-
fendant ACI, asking the court to confi rm and enforce an arbitration award made 
 82.  Id . 
 83.  See id . at *2. The court relied on U.C.C. section 2-614 in interpreting the CISG.  See id . at *3–4 
(citing U.C.C. § 2-614 (2002)). The court distinguished between “surmountable impediments,” in 
which case a seller has to provide substitute performance if reasonable, and “insurmountable impedi-
ments,” in which case performance can be excused without substitution.  See id . at *4.  Macromex was 
closer to the fi rst case, so the court found that the seller was obligated to provide delivery to the buyer 
at another port when delivery at the port specifi ed in the contract became impracticable.  See id . 
 84.  See id . at *4. 
 85.  See id . at *5.  See also CISG,  supra note 2, art. 74 (providing that damages may not exceed loss 
breaching party ought to have foreseen at the time the contract was formed). 
 86. No. 03-4165-JAR, 2008 WL 1924948, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2008). 
 87. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., No. 01 Civ. 1285 (DAB), 2004 WL 324881, at *2 (Feb. 19, 
2004),  vacated , 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission. In an 
amended complaint fi led on August 1, 2006, Guang Dong requested prejudgment 
interest. The parties tried ACI’s counterclaims, and they agreed to offset Guang 
Dong’s liability on the counterclaims by the amount of the arbitral award but 
were in dispute over whether interest accruing on that arbitral award should be 
included in the offset. 
 The court fi rst found that the plaintiff did not waive the right to receive prejudg-
ment interest by not requesting it in its pretrial order. 88 As to whether the plaintiff 
should receive prejudgment interest, the court noted that the arbitral award itself 
provided Guang Dong interest under CISG article 78, which reads, “ ‘[I]f a party 
fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled 
to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under 
article 74.’ ” 89 The court found that “failing to award prejudgment interest would 
impede the purpose of the CISG, which is to further the federal policy of favor-
ing arbitration as a means to resolve disputes by promoting the enforcement of 
arbitral agreements in international commerce.” 90 
 Last, the court had to decide what interest rate to apply. The CISG itself is 
silent on the rate of interest to be applied; 91 the plaintiff wanted the interest rate 
under state law consistent with the rule for domestic arbitration awards, while 
ACI wanted the federal postjudgment interest rate. The court chose the federal 
rate because it believed the higher state rate would overcompensate the plaintiff, 
reward the plaintiff for its delay from incomplete discovery responses, and under-
mine the goal of certainty and stability in international transactions. 92 
 In  Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., Ltd. v. Microfl ock Textile Group 
Corp. , 93 the court reached the opposite result under the CISG and refused to 
award any prejudgment interest arising from an arbitral award. The court agreed 
with the  Guang Dong court that the CISG is silent on this question, but found that 
law in the forum state (Florida), rather than federal substantive law, controlled, 
and that the plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest under Florida law. 94 
The court cited  AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. , 95 an 
Eleventh Circuit case, for the proposition that state law applies when determin-
ing the availability of prejudgment interest. 96 What the court in  Zhejiang Shaoxing 
 88.  See Guang Dong , 2008 WL 1924949, at *3 (noting authority split on whether failure to request 
prejudgment interest in pretrial order constituted waiver). 
 89.  Id . (quoting CISG,  supra note 2, art. 78 (alteration in original)). 
 90.  Id . 
 91.  Id . at *4. 
 92.  See id . The court’s decision is consistent with the two other U.S. decisions on the appropri-
ate rate for prejudgment interest on a foreign arbitration award.  See Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 
No. 01 Civ. 1285 (DAB), 2004 WL 324881, at *2 (Feb. 19, 2004),  vacated , 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 
2005); P.M.I. Trading Ltd. v. Farstad Oil, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 7120 (RLC), 2001 WL 38282, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2001). 
 93. No. 06-22608-CIV, 2008 WL 2098062, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008). 
 94.  See id . 
 95. 508 F.3d 995, 1001–02 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 96.  Zhejiang Shaoxing , 2008 WL 2098062, at *5. 
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ignores, however, is the statement of the  AIG Baker court: “An exception to this 
general rule exists when affi rmative countervailing federal interests are at stake 
that warrant application of federal law.” 97 The  Zhejiang court did not consider 
countervailing federal interests. Indeed, the court’s approach is at odds with the 
purpose of the CISG as it subjects plaintiffs in international arbitrations to po-
tentially confl icting state rules on prejudgment interest rather than to a uniform 
approach that federal law would provide. 
 97.  See AIG Baker , 508 F.3d at 1001–02 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
